Internalist Virtue Epistemology

This monograph works at the intersection of two of the most popular and growing fields in epistemology: epistemic normativity or value and virtue epistemology. This monograph works at the intersection of two of the most popular and growing fields in epistemology: epistemic normativity or value and virtue epistemology. By challenging two hitherto un- or under-explored sets of assumptions—epistemological orthodoxies—operative in those fields and, by rejecting them, the book develops novel approaches to current theories of epistemic value and virtue. The book argues that what is needed is an internalist (i.e. non-externalist) model of epistemic virtue. To accomplish this, it draws on Stoic moral theory, whereby the deployment of virtue—no matter whether one has any ‘external’ success—suffices for completely successful action. Benjamin W. McCraw is instructor of Philosophy at University of South Carolina Upstate.