Strategic Coercion

In this masterly new study an international team of scholars considers how overt threats can be used in international politics to influence the strategic choices of others. They consider a range of coercive activities undertaken by a variety of state and non-state actors, concentrating on the post cold war period. For three decades the analysis of strategic coercion has been dominated by two landmark books: Tom Schelling's Arms and Influence and Alex George's Strategic Diplomacy, both of which addressed the requirements of American foreign policy during the cold war. This book argues for a reappraisal of the role of strategic coercion - defined as the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another's strategic choices. It emphasizes the importance of drawing on the experiences of countries other than the United States, and of considering the new circumstances of the post cold war world. An international team of scholars, led by Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at King's College, London, provides critical commentaries on the work of Schelling and George and a series of fascinating case studies. These cover most regions of the world, a variety of different actors - including terrorist groups - and different forms of coercion - including the use of economic sanctions.