Its central location within the brain, its uniqueness and its distinctive anatomical shape have made the pineal gland the subject of numerous metaphysical hypotheses, ultimately becoming the seat of the soul in René Descartes' philosophy. The question of the substantial union of body and soul-and, by extension, the mechanisms by which the soul acts upon the body-lies at the very heart of Descartes' dualist metaphysics, which is based on a neurophysiology rooted in an erroneous anatomical conception of the brain. Should Cartesian neurophysiology be regarded as a descriptive anatomical study-and therefore entirely erroneous-or rather as a conceptual construct serving his dualist metaphysics? This book begins by examining pre-Cartesian conceptions of the pineal gland, with a view to describing Descartes's instrumentalisation of an original neuroanatomy in the service of his metaphysics. It then proceeds to present a reasoned critique of Descartes's anatomical corpus, from anatomical, metaphysical and theological perspectives.
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