Negative Incentives and Disciplinary Action in China’s Food Safety Regulation

This book offers a systematic and original analysis of how disciplinary pressure shapes food safety regulation in China. This book offers a systematic and original analysis of how disciplinary pressure shapes food safety regulation in China. Focusing on punishment as a regulatory incentive, the book shows that disciplinary action is driven not only by regulatory failure but also by public opinion, institutional design, and the discretionary space within which regulators work. Combining historical analysis, comparative case studies of Shenzhen and Beijing, and an original multi-city survey, the book opens the “black box” of regulatory discipline and explains how intensified accountability can both strengthen compliance and generate defensive governance. Readers will benefit from a theoretically grounded and empirically rich account of how negative incentives operate in contemporary regulation and from a deeper understanding of the tensions among discipline, performance, and state capacity in China and beyond. Placing China in comparative perspective by drawing broader lessons for regulatory accountability beyond the Chinese case, this book will appeal to scholars and students of regulation, public administration, Chinese politics, governance, and food policy, as well as policymakers and practitioners interested in accountability systems.