Routledge Research in Legal Philosophy and Ethical Retributivism

This book explores an analysis of the three parties involved in a crime—the victim, the offender, and the state—it argues that neo-retributivism has not sufficiently incorporated the ethical face of punishment into its theoretical framework. This book explores a foundational philosophical tension in contemporary retributivism, revealing ambiguities in its approach to punishment between two conflicting conceptions of restoration: legal justice and ethical love. Through an analysis of the three parties involved in a crime – the victim, the offender and the state – it argues that neo-retributivism has not sufficiently incorporated the ethical face of punishment into its theoretical framework. The pull of legal justice is often so strong that the voice of ethical love is silenced; neo-retributivism is at an impasse. To navigate this, the book engages with contemporary critical criminal justice scholarship, introducing the ideal of loving justice while highlighting an unresolved tension between penal reformism and abolitionism. The book will be of interest to academicians and researchers working in the areas of philosophy of punishment, criminal law theory, criminal justice, restorative justice, philosophy of law, political philosophy and Hegel scholarship.