Scientific Progress in Philosophy: A Case for Unconditional Optimism

The book defends optimism about philosophical progress. That is, it argues contra pessimists that philosophy makes as much progress as science makes. Garancini first outlines the standards of progress that pessimists endorse, then he argues that philosophical debates throughout history meet these standards. The main case study focuses on Frege’s contribution to the foundation of analytic philosophy, but other examples are given as well. Galileo, Kant, and Beccaria made philosophical progress, and in the recent debate, studies about Fregean exegesis, scientific progress, and paraconsistent logics tick all the boxes for scientific progress. The final output of the discussion is a non-naïve form of optimism. There was progress in philosophy, but there are also barriers the removal of which would result in more progress; not all is good. The book should be a welcome addition to existing studies about the problem of philosophical progress because it brings an historical perspective into this debate. Moreover, the book offers a defense of optimism without presupposing any conception of progress. Indeed, Garancini argues that whatever conception of progress one might have, optimism is true.