Churchill's Grand Alliance

Bol

The Anglo-American alliance was the cornerstone of Churchill's foreign policy after 1940. Churchill carried on the war in 1940 because he believed that American help could save the British Empire. This book argues that his faith was misplaced, and that Franklin Roosevelt saw an end to imperialism as one of America's war aims. The Anglo-American alliance was the cornerstone of Churchill's foreign policy after 1940, and from then up to the present, the 'special relationship' has always been a feature of Anglo-American relations. This controversial study ruthlessly strips away the myth to reveal the unsentimental reality.Churchill carried on the war in 1940 because he believed that American help could save the British Empire. This book argues that his faith was misplaced, that Franklin Roosevelt saw an end to imperialism as one of America's war aims. Fighting until Germany's 'unconditional surrender' meant that Britain ended the war weakened and dependent on America.Churchill, Bevin and Attlee all tried to persuade America into looking after British imperial interests in the post-war period, but as the Cold War dawned the Americans were only interested in using British help when it suited them.Britain's last attempt to act independently of America - Suez - ended disastrously, and the book ends with Anthony Eden's removal from power under American pressure.This is the final work in John Charmley's revisionist triptych of British foreign policy in the mid-twentieth century. The other two books - Chamberlain and the Lost Peace and Churchill: The End of Glory - are also available in Faber Finds.

Bol Partner

The New York Times Book Review called John Charmley's previous book on Winston Churchill ''entertaining, informative, and infuriating.'' With equally impressive scholarship, eloquence, and wit, Charmley now turns to the Anglo-American ''special relationship'' that was the cornerstone of Churchill's foreign policy, ruthlessly stripping away the myth to reveal the unsentimental reality of the Churchill years and beyond, from 1940 to 1957. Churchill carried on the war because of his misguided faith that U.S. help could be enlisted to save the British Empire, contends Charmley. President Roosevelt, however, sought an end to imperialism and thus entered the war only belatedly, ensuring that Britian would end the war weak and dependent on America. And Britian did indeed become a U.S. ''pensioner''-a reality dramatically confirmed in 1956, when American pressure led to the removal of Prime Minister Anthony Eden. With vivid assessments of Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden, John Charmley brilliantly continues his though-provoking-and sometimes infuriating-ways.